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1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Bernard, Jensen & Lawrence (1995), a growing body of em-
pirical work has shown that exporting firms pay higher wages, even after controlling for
firm-level characteristics such as industry and size.1 The ensuing theoretical literature has
proposed two possible mechanisms. On one side, exporting firms might employ workers
with higher skills, so that the exporting wage premium is a reflection of observable and un-
observable workers’ characteristics – the “skill composition” effect (Yeaple 2005, Verhoogen
2008, Bustos 2011, Kugler & Verhoogen 2012). On the other, the presence of frictions in
the labor market might lead exporting firms to pay higher wages than non-exporting firms
for identical workers, because exporting generates rents that are shared with the employees
– the “rent sharing” effect (Cosar, Guner & Tybout 2010, Helpman & Itskhoki 2010, Help-
man, Itskhoki & Redding 2010).2 While these theoretical mechanisms are well understood,
identifying their relative importance empirically has proven difficult. Traditional studies
using average wages at the firm level cannot fully control for workers’ skills and therefore
cannot distinguish between composition or rent-sharing factors. In the last few years, the
literature has taken advantage of the growing availability of matched employer-employee
data to address these issues, but the evidence is still not conclusive.3
In this paper, we use a unique matched employer-employee database including the entire
workforce of a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms to study the effects of exporting
on wages at the firm level. We add to the literature along at least three dimensions. First,
as done by Fr´ıas et al. (2009) for Mexico, we exploit the sudden and large devaluation of
the Italian Lira in 1992 as a source of exogenous variation, within industries, in the firms’
incentive to export. Second, we propose an empirical framework that allows the market
value of individual workers’ observable and unobservable skills to vary before and after the
devaluation. As we show, this is a crucial step in disentangling rent sharing from skill
composition effects. Third, we document the heterogeneous effects of exporting on wages
based on a measure of workers’ export-specific experience.
1For comprehensive surveys, see Schank, Schnabel & Wagner (2007) and (Fr´ıas, Kaplan & Verhoogen
2009).
2Besides specificities and frictions, there are at least two other mechanisms that could imply that the firm
shares the rents from exporting with their workers: efficiency wages (Fr´ıas et al. 2009, Davis & Harrigan 2011)
and fair-wage considerations (Egger & Kreickemeier 2009, Amiti & Davis 2011). See Fr´ıas et al. (2009) for
a more detailed survey of the various theoretical mechanisms behind export wage effects.
3See, among others, Fr´ıas et al. (2009) and Frias, Kaplan & Verhoogen (2012) for Mexico; Schank et al.
(2007) and Baumgarten (2013) for Germany; Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler & Redding (2013) and Krishna,
Poole & Senses (2010) for Brazil. We discuss how our results compare with those of the existing literature
below.
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The linked employer-employee nature of our data allows us to apply the methodology
developed by Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis (1999) (AKM, henceforth) to decompose individ-
ual wages into a component due to observable, time-varying worker and firm characteristics,
a component due to unobservable worker characteristics (“worker effects”) and a compo-
nent due to firm-level, unobservable characteristics (“firm effects”). We take the estimated
worker effects to measure the market value of workers’ unobservable (to the econometrician)
skills, independent of the characteristics of the particular firms where they are employed at
a given point in time, and the firm effect as a wage premium paid by a given firm to all of
its employees. As in Fr´ıas et al. (2009) and Helpman et al. (2013), the firm effect, which
we use as a measure of rent sharing, is estimated separately for each firm-year, so that it
can be related to changes in the firm’s export activity. We estimate worker and firm effects
under two alternative assumptions. First, as typically done in the literature, we assume that
the worker effects are fixed throughout the entire period. Second, we allow the individual
worker effects to vary in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. In fact, the devaluation
represented a major shock to the incentives to Italian firms to export. If workers’ skills are
heterogeneous in terms of their contribution to the export activity, then their market value
might be plausibly affected by the devaluation. By estimating separate worker effects pre
and post devaluation, we are able to account for any change in the market value of skills at
the individual level.
Most of the literature on the effects of exporting on wages has so far treated worker
effects as being fixed over time. One exception is Fr´ıas et al. (2009). Our approach differs
from theirs because we allow each individual worker effect to take different values before
and after the devaluation whereas they estimate time-varying returns to unobservable ability
that are common across workers. Our approach with estimating worker effects is similar to
Card, Heining & Kline (2013), who estimate different AKM models for different periods in
their data to study the increase in earnings inequality in West Germany.
The AKM wage decomposition rests on an assumption of exogenous worker mobility
conditional on observables. In their paper on workplace heterogeneity and wage inequality
in Germany, Card et al. (2013) discuss several possible violations of the exogenous mobility
assumption and suggest a series of tests to detect such violations. We performed the Card
et al. (2013) tests with our data, and find that the AKM assumption is roughly met. In
fact, the tests deliver results that are very similar to those found in Card et al. (2013) for
Germany. Specifically, we find that the departures from the exogenous mobility assumption
suggested by the AKM residuals are small in magnitude, and that including unrestricted
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match effects improves the model’s statistical fit only slightly compared to the AKM model.
Moreover, no pattern of endogenous mobility emerges from the profiles of wage changes for
workers who change firms. Instead, wage changes are entirely consistent with the AKM
model. We conclude that AKM’s additive separable worker and firm effects are reasonable
measures of the unobservable worker and firm components of wages.
Our empirical framework is based on regressing workers’ wage, and its components
(skill composition and rent sharing), on the share of export at the firm level in the post-
devaluation period, accounting for the potential endogeneity of the export share (we discuss
this issue in more detail below). Our results indicate that the increased export activity that
followed the unexpected and large devaluation of the Italian currency in 1992 led to higher
wages. Our estimates imply that, other things equal, wages rose by 1.05-1.30 percent
(on average) at a firm recording the median increase in the export share (15 percent).
In terms of rent sharing or skill composition, we find that, when skills are assumed to
be fixed throughout the period, the whole effect of the increase in exports is due to the
rent-sharing component. This indicates that the characteristics of the workforce have not
changed systematically in relation to the export activity that firms undertook after the
devaluation. In fact, when the worker effects are fixed, only changes in the workforce
composition can change the skill composition at the firm level. However, when we allow the
worker effects to vary before and after the devaluation, we find that the higher wages are
roughly equally due to an increased firm effect, common to the entire firm workforce, and
to an increase in the workers’ effect. Given that we found no evidence of changes in the skill
composition when keeping the worker effects fixed, the increased worker effects in exporting
firms must reflect an increase in the the market value of skills of the workers they employ.
We conclude that exporting firms do share rents with their workers, which is consistent
with recent models that emphasize firm heterogeneity and labor market frictions (Helpman
& Itskhoki 2010, Helpman et al. 2010), but also that the market value of the unobservable
workers’ skills they employ increases after the devaluation. Failure to take this change into
account would lead one to overestimate the rent-sharing component.
To corroborate our interpretation of the results, we explore whether the export wage
premium associated with the devaluation can be linked to a measure of export-specific
workers’ skills. We assume that past experience in exporting firms increases the level of a
worker’s export-specific skill, and find that, indeed, the export effect is significantly stronger
for workers with greater past cumulated export experience. This result, which is robust
to including an extensive set of tenure controls in the regressions, indicates that there is
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heterogeneity across workers in the distribution of skills in terms of how useful they are
for the export activity, and that the devaluation increased the demand for export-specific
skills, driving their relative price up.
One crucial concern when attempting to estimate the effect of exporting on wages, even
in the context of an exogenous change in the incentive to export, is that the most productive
firms might also be those that are better equipped to take advantage of the devaluation. If
this is the case, then a measured “effect” of increased export activity on wages might simply
reflect the underlying heterogeneity, which generated both greater exports and higher wages.
We have taken several steps to lessen this concern: First, we argue that in the Italian case
the concern that exporters are primarily the most productive firms is much less relevant
than in other contexts. In fact, the existing evidence on the exporting activities of Italian
firms indicates that the firms that benefited the most from the 1992 devaluation of the
Italian Lira were not the most advanced firms (across industries) or the most productive
ones (within industries). Crino` & Epifani (2012) document that there is only a weak
relationship between exports and TFP across Italian firms. As a matter of fact, in contrast
to other developed economies, the bulk of the Italian production structure specializes in
medium- and low-tech activities, such as textiles, furniture, and tiles. Bugamelli, Schivardi
& Zizza (2010) show that firms engaged in low-tech activities have benefited the most from
the 1992 devaluation. In this paper, we test directly whether “better” firms experienced
greater increases in the share of sales exported in the devaluation period. We find that
the change in the export share of sales was unrelated to firm size (employment), investment
intensity (measured as the investment to workers ratio), and domestic sales.4 Second, in our
empirical specification, we explicitly control for pre-determined conditions at the firm level.
More specifically, our proposed specification allows for wages in the devaluation period to
be correlated with the pre-devaluation export intensity. This allows us to establish whether
the changes in wages (or wage components) that took place in the devaluation period were
due to the increased export activity or simply to pre-existing heterogeneity. Finally, our
results are very robust to inclusion of firm fixed effects, which control for unobservable,
time-invariant firm heterogeneity.
Our paper contributes to a small but growing empirical literature that uses matched
employer-employee data to study the relationship between exporting activity and workers’
4This contrasts with the Mexican experience as described in Verhoogen (2008) and Fr´ıas et al. (2009).
In Mexico, better, larger firms took more advantage of the peso devaluation of 1993. This is because the
Mexican exports were directed to a large extent towards the US, so that exported goods were on average of
a higher quality than domestically sold ones.
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wages. The paper that is most closely related to ours is Fr´ıas et al. (2009), who use matched
employer-employee data from Mexico and exploit the 1994 devaluation of the Peso as an
exogenous shock to the incentive Mexican firms’ incentives to export. Combining this shock
with a theoretical framework that predicts that more productive, larger firms take better
advantage of the devaluation, they contrast outcomes of firms of different sizes during the
devaluation period and afterwards, finding that most of the effect of exporting on wages
comes from rent sharing. Our paper, too, uses matched employer-employee data and a
large and unexpected devaluation as a source of identification. In contrast to Fr´ıas et al.
(2009), however, we do not focus on differences based on firm size or other indicators of
productivity; rather, we look directly at how wages relate to changes in export shares in
the devaluation period compared to the earlier years. For the reasons explained above, we
argue that in the Italian context this provides a more appropriate estimation strategy. Most
important, our paper differs from theirs in the way we allow for the devaluation to affect
workers’ effects. While they account for potentially time-varying effects by interacting
the worker individual effects with a time effect, we estimate separate workers effects for
the pre and post devaluation period. In fact, when we constrain the worker effects to be
fixed over time, we also obtain that rent sharing explains the bulk of the export wage
premium. Krishna et al. (2010) use matched employer-employee data from Brazil, and find
that when firm-worker match controls are included in the regressions, the effect of trade
openness on wages at exporting firms compared to domestic firms vanishes. In their paper,
however, the firm-worker match is also fixed over time, and it is not allowed to vary with
export activity. Helpman et al. (2013) also use linked employer-employee data from Brazil.
They estimate firm-occupation-year effects which include both wage premia and unobserved
worker heterogeneity. This paper builds a structural model of trade with heterogeneous firms
to estimate the role of trade in determining wage dispersion within occupation; by contrast,
in our paper we focus on disentangling skill composition from rent sharing effects. Another
paper related to our approach is that of Park, Yang, Shi & Jiang (2010), which exploits
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 as an exogenous shock to the incentive to Chinese firms
to export. Compared to our paper, they do not focus on wages specifically but, rather, on
a large set of performance indicators at the firm level. As far as (firm-level average) wages
are concerned, they find that firms that increase exports also pay higher wages.
Finally, our work includes a novel exploration of the heterogeneous effects of trade.
Much of the existing literature has focused on the differential effects of trade across groups
of workers, typically defined by education, occupation (blue collar, white collar, managers),
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and industry. However, these traditional categories are very broad, and potentially mask
substantial within-group heterogeneity. A recent exception is represented by Hummels,
Jorgensen, Munch, & Xiang (2011), who document the heterogeneous effects of trade on
workers who perform different sets of tasks (e.g., creative vs. routine tasks), or whose occu-
pations employ different sets of knowledge (e.g., mathematics, social science, engineering,
etc.). Frias et al. (2012) also contribute to the analysis of the heterogeneous effects of
trade by looking at different percentiles of the within-firm wage distribution. In our pa-
per, we document heterogeneous wage effects of exporting based on an explicit measure of
export-related skills rather than using occupational categories or wage levels. To the best of
our knowledge, the only other paper that considers workers’ export experience explicitly is
Mion & Opromolla (2011), who find that managers with previous export experience receive
a wage premium and increase the likelihood that a firm engages in export activity.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data, perform the estima-
tion of worker and firm effects and test the exogenous mobility assumption. In section 3
we present our main econometric analysis of the effect of exporting on wages, workforce
composition, and firm-level wage premia. In Section 4 we explore the heterogeneity of the
export wage premia across workers, emphasizing the role of workers’ past export experience.
Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and offer directions for future research.
2 Data, wage decomposition, and descriptive evidence
2.1 Data description
The data used in this paper were constructed from the Bank of Italy’s INVIND survey of
manufacturing firms. INVIND is an open panel of around 1,200 firms per year, represen-
tative of manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees. It contains detailed information
on firms’ characteristics, including industrial sector, year of creation, average number of
employees during the year, sales, investment, and, most important for our purposes, ex-
ports. The Italian Social Security Institute (Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale, INPS)
provided the complete work histories of all workers who ever transited in an INVIND firm
in the period 1980-1997, including spells of employment in which they were employed in
firms not listed in the INVIND survey. Overall, we have information on about one million
workers per year, more than half of whom are employed in INVIND firms in any given
year. The rest are employed in about 500,000 other firms of which we only know the unit
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identifier.5
The information on workers includes age, gender, the province where the employee
works, occupational status (production, non-production, manager), annual gross earnings
(including irregular payments such as overtime, shift work, and bonuses), number of weeks
worked, and the firm identifier. We have deleted records with missing entries on either the
firm or the worker identifier, those corresponding to workers younger than 15 and older
than 65, those who have worked less than 4 weeks in a year, and those in the first and last
percentiles of the weekly earnings distribution.
In Table 1 we report summary statistics on workers’ characteristics for the entire sample
(column [1]), which, as explained in Section 2.2 below, we use to estimate worker and
firm effects, as well as for workers employed in INVIND firms (columns [2] and [3]), on
which we base our main analysis. Because precise information on exporting behavior for a
representative sample of firms is available only for INVIND firms after 1987, we will restrict
our attention to INVIND firms in the period 1987-1997. For the entire sample, average
gross weekly earnings at 1995 constant prices are about 378 euros, and the average age of
workers is 37 years. Almost 80% of the observations pertain to males, 66% to production
workers, and 33% to non-production workers. The INVIND sample in years 1987 through
1997 consists of about 4.1 million observations. The descriptive statistics for the INVIND
sample are quite similar to those of the total sample; this was expected, because this sample
includes the same workers but only observations of those who were employed by an INVIND
firm in the period 1987-1997.
Table 2 reports statistics on the firm-year level data used in our main regression analyses.
A total of 1,218 unique firms are included in the INVIND sample in the period considered.
The sample is unbalanced. The median INVIND firm employs about 230 workers, and it
reports sales of over 31 million euros. Eighty-nine percent of the firms in the sample were
exporters in the period considered. Conditional on exporting, the median firm exports 31
percent of their sales. These figures are in line with those reported in other studies on
Italian firms (Crino` & Epifani 2012, Castellani, Serti & Tomasi 2010) and are substantially
higher than those found in other countries. In the United States (Bernard et al. 1995) or
Mexico (Fr´ıas et al. 2009), for instance, only a small proportion of firms do export. This
difference is explained by at least two factors. First, Italy’s main commercial partners
are countries within the European Union (EU), which are located in relative geographic
proximity. Second, the INVIND sample excludes firms with fewer than 50 employees, and
5This is the same database used by Iranzo, Schivardi & Tosetti (2008), to which the reader is referred to
for further details.
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it is a well-known fact that small firms have a much lower propensity to export compared
to larger firms. In fact, comparison of columns [2] and [3] in Table 2 confirms that, even
within the 50+ employee firms, exporters are substantially larger than non-exporters, both
in terms of employment and sales volume.
The devaluation of 1992 was substantial and had a strong impact on exports. Figure
1, Panel (a) reports the multilateral real exchange rate of the lira (Finicelli, Liccardi &
Sbracia 2005). This is the best indicator for our purposes, because it represents a measure
of competitiveness of manufacturing goods. After the initial sharp drop, the exchange rate
kept devaluating (with the exception of an appreciation in the second quarter of 1993) until
mid-1995, when the depreciation compared to January 1992 was of the order of 30 percent.
After that, the currency recorded a stable appreciation, which by the end of the decade
brought the multilateral exchange rate back to around 85 percent of the January 1992
level. Figure 1, Panel (b) shows that the exporting behavior of the INVIND firms changed
after 1992–the year of the Lira devaluation. The median (mean) share of sales exported
increased sharply from around 18 percent (26 percent) in the 1987-1991 period to 30 percent
(34 percent) in 1997. Interestingly, the share starts decreasing in 1997, arguably indicating
the fading away of the competitive advantage. Indeed, this decrease further supports the
view that the sharp rise in exports was linked to the devaluation itself and not to some
other concomitant factor, such as the European single market, whose effects should have
been permanent.
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2.2 Decomposing wages into “skills component” and “rent sharing”
2.2.1 Wage decomposition
Our goal is to establish whether export intensity leads to higher wages, and, if this is the
case, if the higher wages simply reflect the skill composition of the workforce, including
unobservable skills, or also rent sharing, defined as the excess wage that a worker obtains
from working in a given firm compared to the market value of her skills. We exploit the
matched employer-employee nature of our data to perform a decomposition of wages into
two terms that capture the two potential sources of the positive correlation between exports
and wages. Following Abowd et al. (1999) (AKM henceforth), we decompose wages into a
component due to time-variant observable individual characteristics, a “pure” worker effect,
a “pure” firm effect and a statistical residual, using the following equation:
wit = X
′
itβ + θ
F
i +
∑
j
dijtψ
F
jt + εit (1)
where the subscript i denotes the worker, j denotes the firm, t denotes time, X ′it is a vector
of individual time-varying controls, θFi is the worker effect, dijt is a dummy equal to 1 if
worker i is in firm j at time t, and ψFjt is the firm-year effect. We use the superscript F
to indicate that the worker effect is fixed over time, to distinguish this from the case in
which we allow it to vary between the pre and post devaluation period (see below). Abowd
et al. (1999) show that, under the assumption of random workers’ mobility across firms
(conditional on the observables), equation (1) can be estimated and firm and worker effects
separately identified. The identification of firm effects and worker effects is guaranteed by
the substantial mobility of workers in the sample: 63 percent of the workers in the sample
have been employed by at least two different firms in the period 1982-1997, and between
8.4 and 20 percent of workers change employer from one year to the next.
We use the estimated worker effect θˆ
F
i as our measure of the unobserved (to the econo-
metrician) “skill component” of wages. Under the AKM assumptions (see Section 2.2.3
for a discussion), the worker effect represents the component of wages that reflects the
market value of the workers’ unobservable skills, independent of the characteristics of the
particular firm that the individual works for, and net of the workers’ personal time-varying
characteristics included in the controls. The firm-year effect ψFjt represents the firm-specific
contribution to wages, after controlling for individual workers’ characteristics. As such, it
can be interpreted in terms of rent sharing. Because we are interested in relating rent sharing
to the firm’s export behavior, which changes over time (specifically, after the devaluation),
we modified the original Abowd et al. (1999) procedure, which imposes a time-invariant firm
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effect, and estimate a time-varying firm effect ψˆ
F
jt. Note that, thanks to the 50-employee
minimum restriction, and because we observe the complete workforce of all INVIND firms,
for each firm-year we have at least 50 observations (the average is 672 and the median 228 –
see Table 2), which guarantees a reasonably high precision of the estimates of the firm-year
effects.6
The above procedure allows for the firm effect to vary over time while keeping the worker
effect fixed. Although assuming that the individual worker effects do not vary over time is
the standard approach in the literature (Abowd et al. 1999, Fr´ıas et al. 2009, Krishna, Poole
& Senses 2011), it might be too restrictive for the question that we are addressing. As shown
in Figure 1, the average increase in the export share of Italian manufacturing firms was
very large. Such a shift might have induced a change in the market value of different skills.
Indeed, there is evidence that the devaluation has impacted the demand for observable
skills. In Figure 2, we plot the time series evolution of the share of production workers
in the INVIND firms. It decreases regularly from .71 in 1986 to .67 in 1993, following the
secular decline common to all advanced economies. When the devaluation hits, the fall stops
and the share of production workers remains stable until 1998, after which it starts falling
again. This is exactly the period in which the devaluation has boosted the export activity
(see Figure 1) and, possibly, the demand for production workers. More in general, some
workers might be endowed with skills that are more valuable in export markets: for example,
human capital specific to products that were particularly favored by the devaluation. It is
indeed possible that the returns to such skills have increased after the devaluation. If a firm
employs workers with export-valuable skills, it might export more and pay higher wages
because the market value of such skills has increased. By keeping the worker effects fixed,
however, one would exclude this possibility a priori, forcing the higher wages to be picked
up by the firm-year effect, thus attributing the higher wages to rent sharing. To account for
changes in the market value of skills, we therefore allow the worker effects to take different
values before and after the devaluation, estimating an extended version of equation (1) as
6We estimate equations (1) and (2) using all available observations, and not only those of INVIND firms
because this improves the precision of the estimate of the workers’ effects. However, for non-INVIND firms,
for which we have on average 2.5 workers per year, we impose that the firm effect is fixed throughout the
period. Note that these firms do not enter the subsequent analysis because for non INVIND firms we have
no export information, so there is no advantage in recovering a time-varying measure that can be interpreted
in terms of rent sharing for these firms.
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Figure 2: Share of blue collar workers
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follows:
wit = X
′
itβ + θ
V
it +
∑
j
djitψ
V
jt + εit (2)
θVit = (1−DVt)θ
PRE
i +DVtθ
POST
i
where DVt = 1 for t > 1992 and 0 otherwise, and θ
PRE
i and θ
POST
i are worker i’s effects
computed separately for the pre and post 1992 periods. Given that we have data up to 1997,
θPOSTi is estimated on a maximum of 5 observations per individual. The average number
of individual-year observations in the post-devaluation period is 4.1 and the median is 5.
2.2.2 AKM Estimates
Prior to the estimation, we identified the groups of “connected” workers and firms. A
connected group includes all of the workers ever employed by any firm in the group, and
all the firms that any worker in the group has ever worked for. It is only within connected
groups that worker- and firm-effects can be identified (Abowd, Creecy & Kramarz 2002).
By design, our sample consists of essentially one large, connected group, with 99.6% of the
sample forming a single connected group.7 Thus, in our estimation, we focus on the largest
7Note that the this conclusion holds despite the fact that we allow for firm-year effects and, in equation
(2), for different worker effects in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. In fact, even if we treat each
firm-year as a separate effect, a firm in year t employs to a large extent the same workers it was employing
at t− 1, which makes the year-firm observations automatically connected over time. When we estimate the
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connected group and disregard the remaining observations. In Table 3, we present the
results from estimation of equations (1) and (2).8 The dependent variable wit is the natural
logarithm of weekly wages. The vector Xit includes age and age squared (proxying for
labor market experience), tenure and tenure squared,9 a dummy variable for non-production
workers, a dummy for managers (occupational status changes over time for a considerable
number of workers), as well as interactions of al of these terms with a female dummy
variable.
The estimated coefficients on the workers’ observable characteristics, shown in Panel A
of Table 3, deliver unsurprising results: wages appear to exhibit concave age and tenure
profiles, and a substantial wage premium is associated with white collar jobs and, especially,
with managerial positions. Panel B of Table 3 presents the standard deviations of and the
correlations between log wages (wit) and the different components of wages (θ
F
i , θ
V
it , ψ
F
jt,
ψVjt). Similar to Abowd et al. (1999) and Iranzo et al. (2008), a substantial portion of the
variation in earnings is due to heterogeneity in worker effects (the correlation between wages
and worker effects is 0.46 when the worker effects are time-invariant and 0.39 when they are
allowed to vary before and after the devaluation). Firm effects also play an important role
(the correlation between wages and ψFjt is equal to 0.45 and that with ψ
V
jt is 0.44). The two
measures of worker effects (θFi and θ
V
it) are strongly positively correlated with each other
(the correlation between θFi and θ
PRE
i is 0.96 and that between θ
F
i and θ
POST
i is 0.91), and
so are the two measures of firm-year effects (correlation = 0.93). The correlation between
the worker and the firm effects is zero when the worker effects are time-invariant, and turns
negative when the worker effects are time-variant. Finally, the pre- and post-devaluation
worker effects (θPREi and θ
POST
i ) are positively correlated with each other (correlation =
0.83), which was expected; in fact, even though the devaluation might have changed the
returns to skills, workers who commanded a high wage before the devaluation on average
workers’ effects separately for the pre-post devaluation periods, connectiveness is guaranteed by the fact
that, for non INVIND firms, we estimate non-time-varying firm effects. Such effects supply the connection
between the pre and post devaluation periods. We have also repeated all of the regressions below estimating
the θVit and ψ
V
jt effects running two separate regressions for the pre and post devaluation period, and the
results, available upon request, are qualitatively similar.
8The estimation was carried out using the conjugate gradient algorithm proposed by Abowd et al. (2002)
and implemented by the Stata routine “a2reg” developed by Ouazad (2008).
9Our data on tenure is right-censored because we do not have information on workers prior to
1980. To partly account for this censoring, for the affected workers we included age group-specific
trends (based on these workers’ age in 1980) in the AKM regressions. Specifically, we start these
workers’ tenure as if they were joining their employer in 1980, and we interact this tenure variable
with dummy variables reflecting the workers’ age in 1980 (age groups: 16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and
55-65). The results are robust to the exclusion of these additional controls. In fact, the correlation
between the worker (firm) effects with and without the tenure controls is 0.99 (0.98).
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do the same after it. Still, the correlation is substantially below 1, indicating that returns
to (unobservable) skills have changed in the two periods.
2.2.3 Tests of the AKM exogenous mobility assumption
The AKM wage decomposition rests on an assumption of exogenous worker mobility condi-
tional on observables. Following Card et al. (2013, CHK henceforth), we considered various
possible violations of the exogenous mobility assumptions and performed a series of checks.
We describe them below.
Mobility based on the value of worker-firm match In AKM, the firm effects are
wage premia paid to all workers in a given firm, irrespective of the characteristics of the
specific workers. However, if the exogenous mobility assumption is violated due to sorting
based on the value of a worker-firm match component, and workers change jobs to join
firms to which they are better matched, then the wage premium would include a match
component that would be specific to each worker-firm pair, and no longer common across
all workers in the firm. To test for such sorting, we perform two analyses: first, we look at
wage changes for job movers, and second, we compare the AKM regression with a regression
including match (worker-firm) fixed effects.
Wage changes for job movers Following CHK, we considered all job changers in
the years 1980-1997 with at least two consecutive years in the old and new firm. We then
classified the origin and destination jobs based on the quartiles of the estimated firm effects;
we formed sixteen cells based on quartiles of origin and destination, and computed average
wages of movers in each cell in the two years before the change and the two years after
the change. Under the exogenous mobility assumption, workers who move from a “low
firm-effect” firm to a “high firm-effect” firm should experience a wage increase and workers
who move in the opposite direction a wage reduction. Moreover, the wage gain for the
former group and the wage loss for the latter should be roughly symmetrical – the “firm
effect” gained by one group should be roughly equal to that lost by the other group. Also,
workers who transition between firms that pay similar wages should not experience any
wage change. If, instead, the exogenous mobility assumption is violated because workers
change firms based on the value of the idiosyncratic match component, then job changes
will be associated with wage increases even for moves between firms with similar estimated
firm effects, and possibly (if the match component is sufficiently important) even for moves
from high- to low-estimated-firm-effect firms. We report the results of our exercise in Table
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4, together with the number of movers in each of the sixteen cells. Similar to what found
by CHK for the German labor market, we report two main findings: First, workers who
move from a low-firm-effect quartile to a high-firm-effect quartile experience wage increases
that are monotonically increasing with the gap between origin and destination quartiles,
and workers who move in the opposite direction experience similar wage declines; Figure
3, Panel (a) shows the wage profiles for workers leaving the first and fourth quartiles, and
illustrates the (approximate) symmetry of the wage gains and losses of those who move from
the first quartile up and from the fourth quartile down, respectively. Second, the wages of
job changers who stay within the same quartile group are essentially flat between the two
years before and the two years after the move (see Figure 3, Panel (b)). The lack of a
mobility premium for the job changers who stay in the same firm-effect quartile suggests
that idiosyncratic worker-firm match effects are not the primary driver of job mobility, and
the symmetry between wage increases for movers from low to high quartiles and the wage
decreases for movers in the opposite direction are as predicted by the AKM model.
Comparison of AKM and match fixed effects regression If match effects are
important, a model with worker-firm fixed effects should out-perform the AKM model in
terms of statistical fit. We run regressions with match fixed effects (the results are reported
in Table 3, columns [1] and [2]), and compare it with the AKM regression. We find that the
match effects model has an adjusted R2 that is only slightly higher, and a Root MSE only
slightly lower than those from the AKM regression. Thus, although these results indicate
that a match component in wages is present, the improvement in fit relatively to the AKM
model is extremely modest.
Drift in worker-specific ability or fluctuations in the transitory component of
wages predicting firm-to-firm transitions As illustrated in CHK, if workers’ ability
is revealed slowly over time and certain talents are valued differently at different firms,
then workers who turn out to be more productive than expected will receive wage increases
at their original employer, and will also be more likely to move to a firm where their
talents will receive higher compensation. This too would be a violation of the exogenous
mobility assumption and bias the estimates of the firm effects. Similarly, if the idiosyncratic
component of wages is systematically associated with transitions between high-wage and
low-wage firms, that would also violate the exogenous mobility assumption. If that is the
case, the wages of movers will show an upward trend in the years before the move.
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Figure 3: Mean wages of job changers classified by quartile of the AKM firm effect - all
transition, all years (1980-1997).
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Figure 4: Mean Residuals by Person/Firm Effect Deciles
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Note: The figure shows mean residuals from the AKM regression (Table 3, column [2]) by cells
defined by decile of the estimated worker effect x decile of the estimated firm effect.
Trends in wages of movers prior to the move Inspection of columns (2) and
(3) in Table 4 reveals that wages of movers show no systematic trend in the years prior
to their move. In other words, similar to CHK, we find no evidence that transitory wage
fluctuations predict mobility patterns.
Examination of the residuals from AKM We have also examined the residuals
from the AKM regression. Specifically, we again followed CHK and formed deciles based
on the estimated worker effects and firm effects, and computed average residuals in each
of the 100 worker x firm decile cell, to explore whether there are any notable systematic
patterns in the distribution of residuals for particular types of matches. The mean residuals
by cell, shown in Figure 4, generally very small. In 99 cases out of 100, the mean residual
is smaller than 0.01 in magnitude. The largest deviations appear among the lowest-decile
workers and the lowest-decile firms (again, similar to what found by CHK in Germany).
The tests that we performed indicate that the exogenous mobility assumption is sub-
stantially met in our data. There is some evidence that worker-firm match effects are
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present, but a model including unrestricted match effects delivers only a slightly improved
statistical fit compared to the AKM model, and the departures from the exogenous mobility
assumption suggested by the AKM residuals are very small in magnitude. On the other
hand, the symmetry of wage gains upon moving from a low-firm-effect to a high-firm-effect
firm and the wage losses from moving in the opposite direction, and the absence of wage
gains for workers who move between firms with similar estimated firm effects suggest that
match effects are not a primary driver of mobility. Moreover, our data supply a picture that
is surprisingly similar to the German one analyzed by CHK, arguably because the labor
markets of the two countries share many institutional features. We therefore conclude that,
in the Italian manufacturing sector context, the additively separable firm and worker effects
obtained from the AKM model can be taken as reasonable measures of the unobservable
worker and firm components of wages.
2.3 Exports and wages: Descriptive evidence
Before moving to the effects of the devaluation, we first analyze the correlation between
wages and export activity and offer some suggestive evidence on the association between
skill composition and rent sharing and the export wage premium. Of course, at this stage
we cannot interpret this in any causal sense. As a measure of export activity, we use the
share of export sales in total sales. Indeed, most firms in our sample are exporters, but
they do differ considerably in their export intensity (see Table 2).
In Panel A of Table 5, we report the wage regressions. Column [1] uses as dependent vari-
able the log of the individual workers’ weekly earnings (which we will be referring to as “log
wage” for brevity), and controls for worker-level characteristics (gender, age, age squared,
white collar dummy, manager dummy), firm characteristics (employment categories [<100,
100-300, 300-500, and 500+ employees], log of domestic sales, fourteen industry dummies),
as well as four geographic area dummies (South, Center, North-East and North-West) and
ten year dummies (1987-1997). We find a strong, positive association between the export
share (EXSH) and log wages, with a coefficient of 0.093 (s.e. = 0.010). Other things equal,
a one-standard-deviation higher export share is associated with 2.5% higher wages. In col-
umn [2], we repeat the same regression using the average log wage at the firm-year level
as the dependent variable, controlling for firm-year-level workforce characteristics (average
age, average tenure, percentage of females in the firm’s workforce, percentage of white collar
employees), time-varying firm characteristics (employment categories, log of domestic sales)
as well as industry and year dummies. Because the firm-year components, used as our key
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dependent variables below, are measured at the firm-year level, we will use averages at the
firm-year level as our preferred regressions in all of the analyses that follow. We find that
the results are similar, although the coefficient increases slightly to 0.108 (s.e. = 0.006) ar-
guably because the workers’ controls aggregated at the firm level are less precise than those
at the individual level. Finally, in column [3] we include firm fixed effects in the regres-
sion, to control for unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity. The estimated coefficient
is equal to 0.065 (s.e. = 0.010) which indicates that a robust association exists between
within-firm changes in exports and changes in wages.
To disentangle the effect of the skill composition from that of rent sharing, we resort to
the wage decomposition described in Section 2.2 (similar to Fr´ıas et al. (2009)). We define
a skill composition (SC) term as the average worker effect at the firm-year level,
SCjt ≡
1
njt
∑
i
dijtθit (3)
where, as before, dijt is a dummy equal to 1 if worker i is in firm j at time t and njt is
the number of workers in firm j at time t. We measure rent sharing (RS) as the firm-year
effect:
RSjt = ψjt (4)
As before, the superscripts F and V will be used to denote the case in which the worker
and firm effects were obtained from specification (1) (with time-invariant worker effects),
and specification (2) (when the worker effects are allowed to vary before and after the
devaluation), respectively.
Next, we explore the relationship between export intensity and SC and RS, and report
the results in Panels B and C, respectively, of Table 5. Specifically, in the first two columns,
the dependent variables are SCF and RSF (i.e., the measures of skills and rent sharing
obtained with time-invariant worker effects, respectively) and the last two SCV and RSV
(i.e., the measures of skills and rent sharing obtained with time-varying worker effects).
The OLS results reported in column [1] of the two panels indicate that the wage premium
is explained by both workforce composition and rent sharing: the coefficient on the export
share is positive and significant in both panels. However, the elasticity of RSF is almost
three times larger than that of SCF (0.075 vs. 0.027). This finding is reinforced in the firm
fixed effects (FE) specifications of column [2], in which case the coefficient is essentially zero
for SCF and remains positive and significant, albeit slightly smaller, for RSF . These results
suggest that some firms employ higher-skilled workers and export more (OLS results), but
that changes of the export share over time are not reflected, on average, in changes in the
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skill composition. On the contrary, the fixed effects results indicate that there is a positive
correlation between export intensity and RSF within firms over time.
The picture changes somewhat when we use SCV and RSV (column [3], OLS and column
[4], FE). The coefficient in the SCV regression increases considerably while that for RSV
decreases, compared to when SCF and RSF were used. Also, the coefficient on the export
share in the SCV regression remains marginally significant also when we control for firm
fixed effects. The fact that we do find a positive association between within-firm changes
in export shares SCV (i.e., worker effects that were allowed to differ before and after the
devaluation) is consistent with the idea that changes in export intensity associated with the
devaluation might have changed the market values of workers’ skills. Once this is taken into
account, the correlation between export intensity and the skill composition component of
wages increases, and that with rent sharing decreases. We thus hypothesize that imposing
a fixed skill level pre- and post-devaluation might be too restrictive, and might lead one to
attribute to RS part of the effect that is instead due to a change in the market value of
workers’ unobserved skills. Of course, at this stage no claims of causality can be made. We
will return to this point in the next section, after describing our identification strategy.
3 Evidence from the 1992 Devaluation Episode
In this section we tackle the issue of causality in the relationship between exporting and
wages. As mentioned above, we exploit the sudden and substantial devaluation of the Italian
lira that occurred in September 1992 as an exogenous shock to the incentives of Italian firms
to export.
3.1 An unexpected shock to the exchange rate
The currency devaluation of September 1992 was largely unpredicted. The speculative at-
tacks that led to the devaluation started after the Danish referendum of June 2, 1992 that,
quite unexpectedly, rejected the Maastricht Treaty by a small margin (0.7 percent). The
Danish referendum represented a big blow to the process of European integration. One
consequence was diminished credibility of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM), which im-
mediately led to speculative attacks against the weak currencies. The monetary authorities
resisted the attacks until the end of the summer. The Italian lira devaluated by 7 percent
during the weekend of September 12-13. On September 16, the British pound left the ERM;
the lira and the Spanish peseta suspended their exchange rate agreements immediately af-
ter. Italy rejoined the ERM only on November 25, 1996. During the four ensuing years,
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the exchange rate of the lira fluctuated substantially.
Even though the depreciation was unexpected, one might argue that its effects were
differentiated according to some firm characteristics, which in turn might be correlated
with subsequent wage changes. For Mexico, Verhoogen (2008) shows that larger, more
productive firms took greater advantage of the peso devaluation of 1993. This is because
the Mexican exports were directed to a large extent towards the US, so that exported goods
were on average of a higher quality than domestically sold ones. Firms that increased
exports to the US were therefore those already producing high-quality goods before the
devaluation. They undertook further quality upgrading, which led to an increased gap with
respect to non-exporting firms.
It is not clear, however, whether the same patterns characterize the Italian case. In
terms of classical indicators of development, such as income per capita or labor costs, Italy
is a developed economy. However, its production structure was (and still is) specialized in
medium and low-tech activities, such as textiles, furniture, and tiles. Bugamelli et al. (2010)
argue that firms in these sectors were those that benefitted most from the devaluation.
Their argument is based on the assumption that pure price competition is relatively more
important in low-tech activities. The price advantage of a devaluation should have been
therefore more pronounced for firms not at the top of the quality or technology ladder.
The same type of reasoning applies within industries. For example, in the textiles sector,
firms that produce low-quality shirts co-exist with luxury fashion producers. The argument
is that the former might have benefited more from the devaluation because the demand
elasticity for such goods is higher, given the production of close substitutes in low-wage
countries. It is therefore unclear ex-ante which type of firms benefited most from the lira
devaluation. In fact, such benefits might have depended on a series of factors, such as export
destination, relative importance of price competition, product composition, etc., that are
not easily linked to any specific firm characteristic.
To probe the hypothesis that changes in the export share following the devaluation were
to a large extent exogenous with respect to pre-devaluation firm characteristics, we run a
set of regressions similar to those of Verhoogen (2008):
∆EXSHi,t1t0 = α+ ρXi,t0 +Dummies + ηi (5)
where ∆EXSHi,t1t0 is the change in the firm level share of export over total sales between
t0 and t1, Xi,t0 is a firm characteristic measured at t0 and Dummies are sector and area
dummies. In the Mexican case, Verhoogen (2008) and Fr´ıas et al. (2009) use employment,
sales per worker, and TFP as proxies for plant heterogeneity , and find that the estimate of ρ
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for the devaluation period are substantially larger than in other periods. This is interpreted
as showing that “better” firms took greater advantage of the devaluation. We run the
same type of regressions and report the results in Table 6. We consider three periods,
the devaluation period (1991-1995), and pre (1987-1991) and post (1995-1999) periods.
Following Fr´ıas et al. (2009), we regress the change in the share of exports on the log of
domestic sales, the log of employment, and on the ratio between investment and employment
measured in the initial year. We find no significant differences in the coefficients between
the devaluation period and the other two periods for any of the indicators. We conclude
that there is no evidence that “better” firms disproportionately took advantage of the 1992
Lira devaluation.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in singling out the effects of a change in the export share on wages and on
its components, following the 1992 devaluation. For the dependent variable, we consider the
wage, the firm-year average worker effect (which measures the skill composition), and the
year-specific firm component (which measures rent sharing). The identifying assumption
is that changes in export shares in the devaluation period are indeed attributable to the
unforseen devaluation episode and were uncorrelated (as showed in the previous section) to
pre-existing firm attributes commonly used in the literature as proxies for firm “quality.”
We take the years 1987-91 as the base period, before the devaluation occurred,10 and define
DV as a dummy for the years from 1992 onward. We specify our main regression as:
yjt = α+βEXSHjt∗(1−DV)+γEXSHjPRE ∗DV+δEXSHjt∗DV +X
′
jtθ+µj+ǫjt (6)
where j denotes firms and t years, yjt is alternatively the wage w, SC and RS as defined
in equations (3) and (4), respectively, EXSHjt is the current export share, EXSHjPRE
is the average share in the pre-devaluation (1987-91) period, Xjt is a vector of additional
controls of firm and workforce characteristics, and µj are firm fixed effects. In this spec-
ification, β measures the correlation between export share and the dependent variable in
the pre-devaluation period, in the same way as in the basic OLS regressions that were
described in the previous section. For the devaluation period (DV = 1), we control for
pre-existing effects of export on worker compensation by including the share of export in
the pre-devaluation period interacted with the DV dummy. By doing so, we control for the
10Figure 2 shows that the average and median export share in the INVIND sample was very stable during
the pre-devaluation period. We have also run regressions for which we picked 1990 or 1991 as base years,
obtaining very similar results.
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possibility that firms that were exporting more in the pre-devaluation period might have
also been paying higher wages, which could persist in the post-devaluation period; moreover,
this also accounts for the possibility that a higher initial export share might be correlated
with higher wages in the devaluation period, if, as in Fr´ıas et al. (2009), “good firms” take
greater advantage of the devaluation. The coefficient γ will therefore capture any of these
effects, if indeed present. Thus, controlling for the pre-devaluation export propensity, the
coefficient δ measures the effect of the current export share on wages. Despite its simplic-
ity, this specification encompasses many different regimes, according to the values of the
estimated parameters. We discuss the most interesting ones next.
δ = 0, γ > 0 In this case, the relation between wages and export activity is a fixed firm
attribute. The pre-devaluation export share captures this attribute and constitutes a
sufficient statistic to predict the effects of the devaluation on wages, while the actual
share has no effect.
δ > 0, γ = 0 This configuration would indicate that export propensity is not a fixed firm
attribute: a devaluation might entail changes in export that cannot be predicted on
the basis of pre-existing conditions. Moreover, controlling for the current propensity,
pre-existing conditions play no role in determining the impact of export propensity
on wages.
δ > 0, γ > 0 In this case, there is a role for both a pre-determined, fixed component and
for current conditions.
3.3 Main Results
We estimate equation (6) using log wages, SC and RS as dependent variables, and report
the results in Table 7. In panel A we present OLS results, while in panel B we adopt a fixed
effects specification, with the fixed effects defined at the level of the firm.
3.3.1 Assuming time-invariant worker skills
We begin by describing the OLS results. All regressions include firm-year-level workforce
characteristics (average age, average tenure, percentage of females in the workforce, per-
centage of white collar employees), time-varying firm characteristics (employment size cat-
egories, log of domestic sales) as well as region, industry and year dummies. For wages, we
find in column [1] that δ = 0.085, statistically significant at the 1% level, and γ = .037, sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level. This implies that, controlling for the pre-devaluation
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export share, a higher post-devaluation share is associated with higher wages. Moreover,
given that γ is less than half δ in magnitude, the current export share is what matters
the most for wage determination, contrary to the idea that some pre-determined condition,
captured by the pre-devaluation share, is the main driver of the post-devaluation outcomes.
In terms of magnitude, the effect is not negligible: given that the median export share has
increased by approximately 15 percentage points during the devaluation episode, workers in
the median firm recorded a wage 1.3 percent higher following the devaluation. Finally, the
coefficient on the export share in the pre-devaluation period, β, is 0.1, highly significant,
not too dissimilar to what we found in the OLS regressions of Table 5. Columns [2] and [3]
report the results for SCF and RSF (that is, the worker and firm effects estimated while
assuming the worker effects are constant over time) as the dependent variables. For SCF ,
we obtain an estimated δ essentially equal to zero (0.005, not statistically significant). The
coefficient on the pre-share value γ is instead positive (0.026) and statistically significant
at the 1% level. This suggests that the workforce composition is indeed a quasi-fixed at-
tribute, so that, controlling for the pre-devaluation export share, changes in the share after
the devaluation do not affect the firms’ skill composition. Stated differently, the higher
post-devaluation wages do not seem to be due to a workforce composition effect. The re-
lationship between export intensity and workers’ skills is confirmed by the estimate of β
(0.027, statistically significant at the 1% level): “normal” (pre-devaluation) export activity
is associated with higher skills. For RSF , our measure of firm-year wage premia, the esti-
mated δ is positive, statistically significant at the 1% level, and large in magnitude (0.080),
while the estimated γ is small (0.007) and not statistically significant. This indicates that
the higher wages related to increases in the export shares are mostly due to a time-varying
firm effect, which is common to all workers in the firm. This is consistent with the idea that
the firm and the workers share the surplus deriving from the increase in export following
the devaluation. Moreover, the rent-sharing component does not seem to be a fixed firm
attribute in that it is not related to the average export share in the pre-devaluation period.
The coefficient estimate on the export share in the pre-devaluation period, β, is instead
sizable (0.047) and statistically significant; the fact that its magnitude is smaller than that
of δ suggests that a larger share of the surplus is enjoyed by workers after the devaluation
compared to “normal” times.
We now turn to the fixed effects specifications (Panel B of Table 7). This exploits
only within-firm variation, and it ensures that we are controlling for any firm-specific,
time-invariant unobservable characteristics. In fact, one could argue that controlling for
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the pre-devaluation average export share and other firm-level controls such as employment
and domestic sales is not sufficient to account for potential firm heterogeneity. Once we
do that, we obtain a slightly smaller estimate of δ for wages (0.070) in column [1], still
highly statistically significant, which indicates that the effects of export on wages do not
simply reflect a fixed firm attribute. We also still obtain that when we constrain the
worker effects to be time-invariant, all of the wage effect is attributable to changes in
wage premia rather than changes in workforce composition. In fact, when the dependent
variable is SCF (column [2]), the coefficient estimate of δ is negative (-0.014), in line with
the idea that the devaluation might have favored more low-skill firms, and the estimated
γ and β are small and not statistically significant. This is consistent with the view that
the skill composition is a rather fixed attribute so that, once we control for firm fixed
effects, the within-firm variation in exports has very little effect on the skill composition.
Instead, when the dependent variable is the rent-sharing component RSF (column [3]), the
estimated coefficient δ remains positive and strongly significant, and essentially unchanged
in magnitude (0.083). This indicates that within-firm variations in the share of exports over
time are strongly reflected in the rent-sharing component of wages.
3.3.2 Allowing worker skills to vary pre- and post-devaluation
The picture that emerged from columns [1], [2], and [3] of Table 7 Panels A and B is
that the export activity stimulated by the devaluation of the Lira led to higher wages, and
the increased wages were entirely due to rent sharing with little evidence of changes in
skill composition. SCF and RSF , however, were estimated under the assumption that the
worker effect is fixed over time. Such an effect captures the combination of two elements
in the wage determination: the worker’s unobservable skills and the price that the labor
market assigns to such skills. Although it seems plausible that there is a fixed component of
workers’ skills, such as education and other cognitive skills, and non-cognitive ability, it is
less obvious that the market value of these skills is unchanged following such a strong shock
as the devaluation that we are analyzing. Specifically, workers might be heterogeneous in
terms of export-specific skills. For example, the devaluation might have been particularly
advantageous for some products, more traded on international markets. Then, if part of
the human capital is product-specific, workers with the skills that are more useful for the
exporting activity might observe an increase in the market value of their skills. Consider now
the case of a firm with abundant export-specific skills that, after the devaluation, increases
its export share substantially. If the market value of its workers’ skills has increased, the
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firm will increase compensation accordingly, not to share rents but, rather, to meet the
higher market value of its workers’ skills. Failure to allow the worker effects to change
over time would imply that the increased market value of those skills would be absorbed
by the time-varying firm component of wages (RSF ), thus overestimating the rent sharing
component of the correlation between export and wages.
This conjecture is confirmed by the results reported in columns [4] and [5] of Table 7,
where we report the results for SCV and RSV : that is, the average firm-year worker effect
and rent-sharing component estimated while allowing the individual worker effects to take
different values in the pre- and post-devaluation periods (model (2)). In fact, when SCV
is the dependent variable, the estimated δ is positive and statistically significant, in both
the OLS (column [4] of Panel A) and fixed effects (column [4] of Panel B) specifications
(0.032 and 0.031, respectively, compared to 0.005 and −0.014 when using SCF ). The
estimated δ remains large and significant also for RSV (column [5] of Panels A and B)
although its magnitude is reduced compared to when RSF was used (0.054 vs. 0.085 in the
OLS specification and 0.041 vs. 0.083 in the fixed effects specification). Thus, it appears
that the increased wage associated with exporting is due to both a firm-level component,
plausibly related to rent sharing, and a component attributable to a change in the market
value of workers’ unobservable skills. Specifically, the results from the specifications with
firm fixed effects (Panel B, columns [4] and[5]) indicate that the two components contribute
roughly equally to explaining the effect of export intensity on wages. Not allowing the
worker effects to vary over time would have led to incorrectly concluding that the wage
premium was entirely explained by rent sharing, with workers’ skills not playing any role.
We will provide further corroboration to this interpretation in section 5.3 below, where we
will relate the export wage premium to a measure of export-specific worker experience.
3.4 Accounting for effort and productivity
We address two potential concerns that one might have with the analysis above and our
interpretation of the results: the estimated coefficient δ might be reflecting increased worker
effort in response to the extra demand, or it might reflect increased productivity that is
related both to higher wages and to higher exports.
The first concern arises because our wage measure is total weekly earnings and we
have no information on hours worked at the individual level in the social security data. If
employees in firms that increase the export share after the devaluation are working more
hours per week to meet the extra demand, we would be capturing an effect on hours and not
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directly on the wage rate. Fortunately, the INVIND firm survey does report the total hours
worked at the firm-year level, from which we can recover a measure of average per capita
hours. The results from including this additional control in the regressions are reported in
Panel A of Table 8.11 The table presents results from fixed effects specifications, for which
the fixed effects are defined at the level of the firm. As can be seen in columns [1], [3] and [5],
hours worked are positively and significantly correlated with wages as well as with the firm
effects (both RSF and RSV ). However, our main coefficient of interest, δ, is still positive,
sizable, and statistically significant, and its magnitude is only slightly reduced with respect
to the results reported in Table 7. The estimates for the worker effects (both SCF and
SCV ) are essentially unaffected. This indicates that the effects on the total compensation
is not just due to an increase in the number of hours worked.
The second possible issue is that the firm might become more productive as a conse-
quence of expanding its export activities due to “learning by exporting” (De Loecker 2011).
Indeed, evidence from other contexts does suggest that labor productivity and TFP increase
when firms begin exporting or when they expand their exports (Park et al. 2010). Thus,
this would be a different mechanism for export to affect wages other than skill composition
and rent sharing. To account for this possibility, we include TFP in the regression, com-
puted using the Olley & Pakes (1996) procedure (see Iranzo et al. (2008) for the details).
Because computing TFP requires further data, available only for a subset of firms, when
we include TFP in the regressions (Panel B of Table 8), our sample size is reduced to 3,858
firm-year observations. In spite of this, our results are robust to the inclusion of TFP in
the controls. The estimated coefficient δ remains sizable and statistically significant (at the
1% or 5% level in all cases, except in the RSV regression, where the estimated is significant
at the 10% level), and both workers’ skills and rent sharing contribute to the export wage
premium. TFP shows a strong positive correlation with wages.
4 Export wage premium and workers’ past export experience
Our results imply that workers enjoy higher wages when their firm increases its exports.
The export wage premium is explained both by a firm-year factor, RS, which we interpret
as rent sharing, and by a skill composition effect, SC, that emerges only if we allow the
returns to (unobservable) skills to differ in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. The latter
result can be explained if: a) there is heterogeneity in the distribution of skills in terms of
11Note that because of some missing values in hours worked, our estimation sample is reduced from 6,328
to 6,219 observations.
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usefulness for the export activity; and b) the devaluation increases the demand for those
skills, driving their relative price up. In this section, we corroborate this interpretation by
testing whether the export wage premium associated with the devaluation can be linked to a
measure of export-specific workers’ skills. Measures of such skills are typically unobservable
in administrative data or labor force surveys. Our data, however, allow us to construct a
measure of export-related skills: workers’ past experience in exporting activities. If produc-
ing for foreign markets requires a certain degree of specificity, then it seems plausible that
a worker employed by an exporting firm can actually accumulate export-specific human
capital.12 We therefore construct a cumulated export experience variable as follows:
EXPER5Yit =
5∑
k=1
EXSHj(i,t−k) (7)
where i denotes workers, t denotes time, j(i, t) denotes the firm where worker i was employed
at time t, and EXSHj(i,t) is firm j’s export share at time t. The index EXPER5Yit can
take values between 0 (if a worker was employed in firms that produced only for the domestic
market in the previous five years) and 5 i(f the worker was employed in firms that exported
its entire output in the previous five years). Given that we are interested in the effects of
an individual characteristic (export experience) on wages, we perform this analysis on the
individual workers’ data rather than on firm-year averages. Because we have information
on exports for INVIND firms only, the export experience index can be computed only for
workers who have been employed at INVIND firms throughout the 1987-1997 period. This
subsample consists of 58 percent of the total INVIND workers’ sample. As shown in column
[4] of Table 1, the characteristics of these workers are very similar to those in the full sample.
Because export data are available only starting in 1984, a five-year export experience index
can be computed only starting in 1989. Thus, the sample is reduced to slightly less than
1,200,000 person-year observations. In 1991, the year before the devaluation, the mean
(standard deviation) EXPER5Y was equal to 1.21 (1.06).13
In Table 9 we present results from estimating the following equation:
wit = α+ βEXSHj(i,t) ∗ (1−DV ) + γEXSHj(i,t)PRE ∗DV
+ δ0EXSHj(i,t) ∗DV + ζEXPER5Yit + ξEXPER5Yit ∗DV (8)
+ δ1EXSHj(i,t) ∗EXPER5Yit ∗DV + θ
′Xij(i,t) + µj + ǫit
12Mion & Opromolla (2011) find evidence of this mechanism for managers in Portuguese firms.
13We have also performed all the regressions with EXPER3Yit, defined in an analogous way but con-
sidering only the previous 3 years of employment, which allows us to use the entire 1987-1997 period. We
obtained very similar results (available upon request). In 1991, the mean (median) EXPER3Y was equal
to 0.81 (0.68).
27
which is a version of equation (6) augmented with EXPER5Yit and its interaction with DV
and EXSHj(i,t)∗DV . In equation (8), the coefficient δ0 captures the baseline effect of post-
devaluation contemporaneous export on wages for workers with no past cumulated export
experience, and δ1 measures whether the effect is related to past export experience. By
interacting past experience with the export share, we allow for exports to have heterogeneous
effects across workers according to their export experience: in the post-devaluation period,
∂wit/∂EXSHj(i,t) = δ0 + δ1 ∗EXPER5Yit.
In Panel A of Table 9, we present OLS results, and in Panel B results from fixed effects
regressions, with the fixed effects defined at the firm level. In all cases, the control vector
Xij(i,t) includes worker characteristics (gender, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared,
white collar dummy, manager dummy), firm characteristics (four employment categories
[<100, 100-300, 300-500, 500+ employees], log of domestic sales, fourteen industry dum-
mies), as well as a set of four geographic area dummies and eight year dummies; we cluster
the standard errors at the firm-year level. Column [1] in both Panels A (OLS) and B (firm
fixed effects) shows that our main coefficient of interest, δ1, is positive and statistically
significant, indicating that the export wage premium increases with a worker’s past export
experience. Using the estimates from column [1], Panel A, we obtain that a one-standard
deviation increase in EXPER5Yit increases the wage by 1.1 percent for a worker in a firm
with an export share equal to the sample mean. The direct effect of export experience
and its interaction with the devaluation dummy are instead slightly negative (marginally
significant), which indicates that having export experience bears no premium in a firm that
does not export.
Within firms, EXPER5Yit varies both cross-sectionally (because workers vary in their
tenure at the firm) and longitudinally for workers with the same tenure but who were hired
in different years. Even thogh our regressions do include a quadratic tenure term, it is
possible that EXPER5Yit is picking up a tenure effect if the quadratic term does not fully
capture workers’ tenure profiles. In particular, for workers at their first job, EXPER5Yit
will grow with tenure (unless the firm has zero export). Thus, it might then be the case
that workers with longer tenure receive a larger share of the extra rent generated by the
increased exports during the devaluation period. To account for this possibility, in column
[2], we include a full set of tenure dummies, and interactions of each of these dummies with
EXSHj(i,t) ∗DV ; that is, we allow for the post-devaluation export share to affect workers
with different tenure at the firm differently. Comparing columns [1] and [2], we see that the
estimates of δ1 are virtually unchanged in both the OLS and firm fixed effects regressions.
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In the INPS-INVIND data, tenure is measured precisely for workers who joined their firm
in 1981 or subsequent years, but it is censored for those who were in the firm’s workforce
as of 1980, the first year in the data set.14 In column [3], we report results from the same
specification as in column [2] but limiting the sample to the cohorts of workers who joined
their current employer after 1980, for whom tenure is precisely measured, and we obtain
very similar results - the estimated δ1 (both OLS and firm fixed effects) is still strongly
statistically significant and actually larger in magnitude.
Thus, we find that the export wage premium is larger for workers with higher cumulated
past export experience. This finding, and its robustness to controlling for tenure, corrobo-
rates our interpretation of the previous results that part of the export wage premium is due
to an increase in the market value of workers’ skills specifically related to export activity.
5 Conclusions
We exploited the large and unexpected devaluation of the Italian lira in 1992 to study the
effect of firms’ exporting activity on wages. We documented that because of the structure
of Italian exports, there was no systematic relationship between pre-determined measures
of firm “quality” (employment, sales, investment) and the extent to which firms benefited
from the devaluation in terms of increased exports, which considerably lessens endogeneity
concerns that are paramount in other contexts (see, e.g., Verhoogen (2008), Fr´ıas et al.
(2009) and Park et al. (2010)). Our matched employer-employee data allowed us to dis-
tinguish between workforce composition effects, changes in the market value of workers’
unobservable skills, and an actual export wage premium enjoyed by workers above and be-
yond what they would get in non-exporting firms. The results indicate that the increase
in the export share of sales induced by the 1992 devaluation did cause wages to be higher,
and that this effect was due to both exporting firms paying a wage premium and to changes
in the market value of workers’ unobservable skills. A novel contribution of this paper is
to show that this result depends crucially on whether one allows the returns to individual
workers’ unobservable skills to vary over time. We argued that it is plausible to expect
that a large shock such as the 1992 lira devaluation would have an impact on the market
value of workers’ unobservable skills, especially if these are export-specific. In fact, we have
shown that imposing that the market value of workers’ unobservable skills is fixed over time
14[1] and [2] included a dummy variable for workers who were already employed as of 1980, as well as
trends based on these workers’ age in 1980 as described in footnote 9.
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(as typically done in the literature) would have led one to erroneously attribute all of the
export premium to a firm-year component, common to all workers in the firm.
The “rent-sharing” effect is consistent with theoretical models that emphasize the role of
firm heterogeneity and frictions, and that predict an effect of trade on wage dispersion across
occupations, industries, and firms (Helpman & Itskhoki 2010). The “skill composition” ef-
fect, together with our finding that the workers who benefited the most were those with more
export-related past experience, documents the importance of export-specific skills, which
are typically not observed in traditional datasets. This is in fact another novel contribution
of this paper, and the result that the change in the export share in the devaluation period
had a significantly stronger effect on workers with more past cumulated export experience
further supports a causal interpretation of the effects of export on wages.
In addition to providing new evidence on the relationship between exporting and wages,
our paper has implications for both future empirical and theoretical analysis. On the
empirical front, researchers have only recently started exploring the heterogeneous effects of
export shocks within industries and occupations and within firms (Helpman et al. 2013, Frias
et al. 2012, Hummels et al. 2011); future research should aim at obtaining more precise
measures of export-specific skills. On the theoretical side, our findings suggest that labor
market frictions and export-specific skills should be essential ingredients in models of the
effects of international trade on wages.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, workers
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Entire sample Entire sample INVIND sample INVIND stayers
1980-1997 1987-1997 1987-1997 1987-1997
mean mean mean mean
(st.dev.) (st.dev.) (st.dev.) (st.dev.)
Weekly wage 377.6 401.1 404.2 397.4
(160.2) (182.0) (168.5) (165.5)
Age 36.9 37.6 38.8 40.0
(10.0) (10.1) (9.9) (10.3)
Tenure 5.11 6.5 8.1 10.1
(4.12) (4.6) (4.7) (4.5)
Males 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.74
Production workers 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.68
Non-prod. workers 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.31
N. Observations 18,635,710 11,042,916 4,074,074 2,772,321
Notes: Entire sample refers to all workers in the data set; INVIND sample only includes workers
who are currently employed by a firm that belongs to the Bank of Italy-INVIND survey and with
non-missing information on export activity. See Section 2.1 for a description of the data.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, firms
[1] [2] [3]
All Exporters Non-Exporters
Employment
Mean 672.3 720.9 287.4
(st.dev.) (3,207.9) (3,397.4) (473.9)
Median 228 245 147
Sales
Mean 112,846.0 120,801.8 49,891.3
(st.dev.) (539,967.5) (570,717.2) (130,019.8)
Median 31,240.6 33,712.8 16,500.3
Export (0/1) 0.89 1 0
Export Share of Sales
Mean 0.31 0.34 0
(st.dev.) (0.27) (0.27) 0
Median 0.25 0.31 0
N. Obs. 7,585 6,734 851
Notes: The sample includes firms in the INVIND sample in the period 1987-1997 and with non-
missing information on export activity. Sales are expressed in thousands of euros (in constant 1995
prices).
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Table 3: Estimating worker effects and firm effects: Two-way fixed effects regressions
Panel A: AKM Regressions Results
[1] [2]
θFi , ψ
F
it θ
V
it , ψ
V
it
Number of Observations 18,552,601 18,552,601
Number of Worker/Worker-Period FEs 1,711,542 2,757,402
Number of Firm-Year FEs(∗) 459,563 459,563
F (Prob > F) 49.99 (0.000) 40.72 (0.000)
R-squared; Adj. R-squared 0.87; 0.85 0.90; 0.87
Root MSE 0.124 0.111
Coeffs. on worker characteristics:
Age 0.0333 0.0394
Age squared -0.0002 -0.0002
Age * Female -0.0153 -0.0169
Age squared * Female 0.0001 0.0001
Tenure(∗∗) 0.0094 0.0059
Tenure squared -0.0004 -0.0003
Tenure * Female -0.0025 -0.0002
Tenure squared * Female 0.0001 -0.00001
White collar 0.0699 0.0533
Executive 0.5136 0.4252
White collar * Female -0.0073 -0.0024
Executives * Female 0.0191 -0.0010
Comparison with Match Effects Model(∗∗∗)
Match Effects Model R-Squared; Adjusted R-Sq. 0.90; 0.87 0.92; 0.89
Root MSE 0.122 0.115
Notes: The sample includes all firms and all workers in the largest connected group. The estima-
tion was performed using the conjugate gradient algorithm proposed by Abowd et al. (2002) and
implemented by the Stata code “a2reg” written by Ouazad (2008). See Section 2.2 for more details.
(*) Year-specific firm effects are estimated for INVIND firms whereas the estimated firm effects are
time-invariant for non-INVIND firms. (**) To partly account for the censoring of the tenure variable
for workers who appear in the data set prior to 1981, we included age group-specific trends based
on these workers’ age in 1980. Specifically, we start these workers’ tenure as if they were joining
their employer in 1980, and we interacted this tenure variable with dummy variables based on the
workers’ age in 1980 (age groups: 16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-65). These coefficients are not
reported to save space. (***) Column [1] includes worker-firm match fixed effects, and column [2]
includes pre- and post-devaluation worker-firm match effects.
Panel B: Variance-covariance matrix of
workers’ and firms’ effects
wit θ
F
i θ
V
it ψ
F
it ψ
V
it
wit 0.34
θFi 0.46 0.24
θVit 0.39 0.95 0.28
ψFit 0.45 -0.02 0.01 0.13
ψVit 0.44 0.01 -0.04 0.93 0.13
Notes: The diagonal entry reports the standard deviation and the other entries are correlations.
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Table 4: Mean Log Wages Before and After Job Change, by Quartile of AKM Firm Effect
at Origin and Destination Firms
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Change from
Origin/ Mean log wage of movers 2 years
destination N. of 2 years 1 year 1 year 2 years before to 2
quartile(*) obs. before before after after years after
1 to 1 1,529 5.51 5.52 5.54 5.56 0.05
1 to 2 1,920 5.44 5.45 5.62 5.65 0.20
1 to 3 3,062 5.42 5.42 5.72 5.77 0.36
1 to 4 2,479 5.43 5.46 5.87 5.94 0.51
2 to 1 1,481 5.60 5.62 5.49 5.51 -0,10
2 to 2 5,334 5.60 5.60 5.62 5.64 0,05
2 to 3 23,419 5.86 5.85 5.90 5.93 0,08
2 to 4 5,769 5.66 5.67 5.92 5.95 0,28
3 to 1 2,133 5.78 5.78 5.53 5.49 -0,29
3 to 2 12,171 5.75 5.76 5.73 5.74 -0,01
3 to 3 53,004 5.81 5.80 5.83 5.85 0,03
3 to 4 23,102 5.84 5.83 5.97 5.98 0,14
4 to 1 1,419 5.89 5.94 5.50 5.53 -0,36
4 to 2 3,648 5.85 5.86 5.69 5.71 -0,13
4 to 3 21,826 5.86 5.88 5.85 5.87 0,01
4 to 4 76,975 6.03 6.03 6.07 6.08 0,05
Notes: Entries are average log real weekly earnings for job changers observed for at least 2 years
prior to a job change and 2 years after, and with only one transition in the period considered. (*)
Quartiles are based on firm effects estimated with the Abowd-Kramarz-Margolis method (Equation
(2) in the text).
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Table 5: Export Intensity and Wages, Skill composition and Rent sharing: Cross-Sectional
and Within-Firm Patterns
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Wages
Log wage
EXSH 0.093*** 0.108*** 0.065***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Specification OLS OLS FE
Observations 4,074,074 7,579 7,579
R-squared 0.59 0.77 0.96
Panel B: Skill Composition
SCF SCV
Export share of sales 0.027*** -0.007 0.042*** 0.016*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Specification OLS FE OLS FE
Observations 7,579 7,579 7,579 7,579
R-squared 0.67 0.96 0.64 0.89
Panel C: Rent Sharing
RSF RSV
EXSH 0.075*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.048***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012)
Specification OLS FE OLS FE
Observations 7,579 7,579 7,579 7,579
R-squared 0.55 0.89 0.47 0.84
Notes : The sample includes INVIND firms, years 1987-1997. OLS denotes Ordinary Least Squares
and FE firm fixed effects specifications. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.
Panel A. An observation is a worker-year in [1] and a firm-year in [2] and [3]. The dependent
variable is the log of individual weekly earnings in [1] and the average of log weekly earnings in
the firm-year in [2] and [3]. All regressions include controls for worker gender, age, tenure, white
collar, manager, employment categories (<100, 100-300, 300-500, 500+ employees), log of domestic
sales, industry dummies (14), geographic area dummies (4) and year dummies (10). Panel B. SCF
are firm-year averages of the time-invariant worker effects (AKM regression of Table 3, column [1]),
and SCV are firm-year averages of the worker effects that were allowed to vary before and after the
devaluation (Table 3, column [2]). See section 3.2 and Table 3 for details. Panel C. RSF are firm-
year effects obtained from AKM regressions where the worker effects were time-invariant (Table 3,
column [1]), and RSV are firm-year effects obtained from AKM regressions where the worker effects
were allowed to vary before and after the devaluation (Table 3, column [2]). See section 3.2 and
Table 3 for details.
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Table 6: Changes in export and initial conditions
[1] [2] [3]
Dependent variable: ∆ EXSH
Periods
91-87 95-91 99-95
Dom. sales 0.011** 0.016*** 0.011*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
[ 0.45] [0.46]
Employment -0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
[0.16] [0.71]
Inv./workers -0.000 0.000 -0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
[0.95] [0.67]
Notes : Each coefficient comes from a separate regression. The dependent variable is the change in
the share of export over total sales over the relevant interval. Dom. sales is the log of real domestic
sales, employment the log of the number of employees, and Inv/workers the log of real investment
over the number of employees. The regressors are measured at the initial year of the relevant interval
(i.e., Dom. Sales in column [1] is the log of real domestic sales in 1987, in columns [2] in 1991 and
so on). Standard errors in round brackets. In square brackets, we report the p-value of a test of
equality of the coefficient with the corresponding coefficient for the 95-91 regression. All regressions
include 17 sector and 4 area dummies. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Devaluation Regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dependent variable: Log W SCF RSF SCV RSV
Panel A: OLS
δ : EXSH ∗DV 0.085*** 0.005 0.080*** 0.032*** 0.054***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015)
γ : EXSHPRE ∗DV 0.037** 0.026*** 0.007 0.028** 0.006
(0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
β : EXSH ∗ (1−DV ) 0.100*** 0.041*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.057***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Observations 6,328 6,328 6,328 6,328 6,328
R-squared 0.77 0.68 0.55 0.66 0.48
Panel B: Firm F.E.
δ : EXSH ∗DV 0.070*** -0.014** 0.083*** 0.031*** 0.041***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
γ : EXSHPRE ∗DV 0.034** 0.008 0.025 0.005 0.025
(0.017) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
β : EXSH ∗ (1−DV ) 0.082*** 0.007 0.071*** 0.013 0.066***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Observations 6,328 6,328 6,328 6,328 6,328
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.87 0.88 0.82
Notes : The sample includes INVIND firms, years 1987-1997. One observation is a firm-year.
EXSH is the share of sales that is exported. EXSHPRE is the average export share in the pre-
devaluation period. DV is a dummy variable equal to 1 after 1992 (devaluation period). Controls
include firm-year-level workforce characteristics (average age, percentage of females in the workforce,
percentage of white collar employees), time-varying firm characteristics (employment categories, log
of domestic sales) as well as year, industry, and region dummies. SKF and RSF are firm-year level
worker effects and firm effects obtained from the AKM regressions described in Table 3, Column
[1] where the worker effect is time-invariant, and SKV and RSV were obtained from the AKM
regressions described in Table 3, Column [2] where the worker effects were allowed to take different
values in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. See Section 3.2 and Table 3 for more details. OLS
results are reported in Panel A and firm fixed effects results in Panel B. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Robustness tests
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dependent variable: Log W SCF RSF SCV RSV
Panel A: Controlling for hours worked
δ : EXSH ∗DV 0.058*** -0.015*** 0.071*** 0.029** 0.029**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Hours worked 0.062*** 0.002 0.065*** 0.005 0.061***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 6,219 6,219 6,219 6,219 6,219
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.82
Panel B: Controlling for hours worked and TFP
δ : EXSH ∗DV 0.058*** -0.030*** 0.089*** 0.032** 0.031*
(0.014) (0.006) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Hours worked 0.069*** 0.000 0.073*** 0.002 0.071***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
TFP 0.032*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.003 0.029***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 3,858 3,858 3,858 3,858 3,858
R-squared 0.96 0.98 0.91 0.89 0.86
Notes : The sample includes INVIND firms, years 1987-1997. One observation is a firm-year.
All results are from fixed effects regressions, where the fixed effect is defined at the level of the
firm. See the Notes to Table 6 for the definitions of the dependent variables, the explanatory
variables, and the list of control variables. Panel A: The controls include average hours worked
(total house/employees) at the firm-year level. Panel B: The controls include average hours worked
and TFP. See section 4.4.1 for details. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Export wage premium and workers’ export experience
[1] [2] [3]
Dependent variable: Log W
Panel A: OLS
δ0 : EXSH ∗DV 0.061** 0.073*** -0.052
(0.025) (0.028) (0.036)
δ1 : EXSH ∗DV ∗ EXPER5Y 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.052***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
EXPER5Y -0.013** -0.013** -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
EXPER5Y ∗DV -0.015* -0.020* -0.018*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Tenure Dummies & Interactions No Yes Yes
Observations 1,176,688 1,176,688 267,301
R-squared 0.60 0.60 0.62
Panel B: Firm F.E.
δ0 : EXSH ∗DV 0.152*** 0.154*** 0.063***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.021)
δ1 : EXSH ∗DV ∗ EXPER5Y 0.013** 0.013** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
EXPER5Y -0.003 -0.005 -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
EXPER5Y ∗DV -0.001 0.000 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Tenure Dummies & Interactions No Yes Yes
Observations 1,176,688 1,176,688 267,301
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.67
Notes : INVIND panel, years 1989-1997. One observation is a worker-year. EXPER5Yit measures
five-year cumulated past export experience for worker i in year t. See section 4.5 for details. Addi-
tional controls include age and age squared, gender, white collar indicator, manager indicator, log
employment, log of domestic sales, and indicators for year, industry, and region. Standard errors,
clustered by firm-year, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.
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